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This conclusion notes the rise of relationalism in theorising peacebuilding and the advantages of 
this approach as evident in the contributions to this special issue. Nevertheless, it cautions against 
such a move and in particular, some of the ontological and epistemological consequences of the 
relational turn as evident in recent poststructuralism, postcolonial approaches and practice theory. 
It contrasts this with the critical realist approach ± whose relationalism has been ignored by the 
current turn ± allowing both relationalism and a belief in objectivity and preference for certain 
knowledge claims. 
 




The argument set out in the introduction and pursued through this special issue is that 
international peacebuilding is embroiled in the ¶SUREOHP· of difference. While recent 
scholarship, as well as recent practice, now attempts to account for the problem of difference, 
rather than denying or suppressing it, these attempts to engage with it are deeply problematic. 
As the editors Pol Bargués-Pedreny and Xavier Mathieu note, the three errors are to either 
silence, problematise or stigmatise difference with recent attempts failing to engage with the 
conditions of its emergence. In particular, peacebuilders have assumed that countries would, 
with the right international support, transition to liberal democracy. In reaction to this, 
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scholars started to emphasise the role of culture, a greater concern with political contestation 
and the role of psychosocial factors. 
 
Hence the first error silences difference through the imposition of universalist frameworks 
that neglect the different roles and identities of the actors involved. In response, peacebuilding 
approaches sought to draw attention to difference and investigate local history and 
understandings. The context for intervention was broadened to include social and cultural 
processes (Lederach 1997). However the second error is to treat difference as a problem to be 
solved, effectively essentialising difference as belonging to distinct and homogenous groups. 
The danger then is to contribute to the legitimisation of ethno-nationalist perspectives 
(Campbell 1998). The role of the peacebuilder is to manage and regulate these perceived 
differences through top down interventions mainly focused on liberal institution building as a 
means of ameliorating the effects of certain socio-cultural pathologies (Fukuyama 2005; Ghani 
and Lockhart 2008; Paris and Sisk 2009). 
 
The third approach is to see difference not as a problem to be solved but as having a potentially 
positive role to play in building peace. Rather than seeing differences as an obstacle to be 
managed through better peacebuilding, scholars adopting this approach seek a more genuine 
engagement with difference (Mac Ginty, 2015, Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2016). This 
approach is critical of the imposition of liberal norms, seeking instead more local or hybrid 
forms of peace based on bottom-up dynamics (Donais, 2009, Richmond, 2009, Mac Ginty 
and Richmond, 2016). The error identified with this third approach is that in order to respect 
difference, it is necessary to decide what this difference is, thus maintaining some form of 
stigmatization of difference as somehow deviant from the normal. Local culture and traditions 
are understood through a Western frame of reference from which these diverge. As the 
authors say in the introduction ¶HPSKDVLVLQJ difference (even as something to be celebrated 
or as a space to cultivate bottom-up peace initiatives) does not remove the stigma attached to 
it insofar as what passes for ´QRUPDOµ is not questioned nor made explicit·  
 
In short, all these approaches are seen as ending up essentialising difference either through 
silencing, problematising or stigmatizing it. The arguments of this special issue are therefore 
refreshing in bringing in an understanding of difference that is non-essentialist and relational. 
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I have summarized the main points here in order to show my agreement. The various 
contributions emphasise the role of cultural difference and reject the imposition of 
universalism and fixed identities. Peacebuilding is to be seen as a process which constantly 
evades any conclusive settlement. Differences are performed realities that arise in specific 
social and historical contexts. Moreover, differences are intrinsically linked to power relations. 
Such arguments are uncontestably a good thing. They are all consistent with the critical realist 
framework that I support. 
 
However, I want to take issue with the radical relationality of this position which flows from 
the excesses of poststructuralism and postcolonialism. In the rest of this piece I will discuss 
some of the ontological and epistemological assumptions behind some of the main arguments 
for a relational approach to difference. This is not to reject relationality, but to ask what type 
of relationality? Using critical realism I will investigate the philosophical foundations of some 
of the main arguments on this. In particular I will use Bhaskar and Bourdieu to argue that 
social structure also needs to be brought in alongside the focus on practice and performance. 
 
 
Difference as a Relation of Power 
 
To summarise from the introduction to this issue, the contributors draw on a combination of 
philosophy, anthropology and feminist / queer theory in order to make three arguments for 
relationality. They argue that it is non-essentialist, link it to power relations and suggest that it 
is performative, taking place in multiple contexts. A later section will look at the issue of 
performativity, while this section looks as difference understood as a power relation. It agrees 
with the need to see difference as relational, but sees some limitations in the reliance on 
particular forms of philosophy, anthropology and feminist / queer theory, arguing for a more 
realist approach to power based on arguments from Bhaskar (1979, 1993) and Isaac (1987). I 
take up here the HGLWRUV· call to explore the ways in which difference can be understood in its 
political context of emergence and suggest that this is best understood through the critical 
realist lens of social stratification and embeddedness in social structure. 
 
Such arguments are built on the realist assumption that there exists a social reality that is 
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structured and relatively enduring over time and is, for this reason, open to scientific 
investigation. The social world is complexly stratified, with different emergent processes that 
arise in specific historical contexts. Emergence, in a critical realist sense means that processes 
have both underlying and necessary conditions of possibility, and emergent and irreducible 
outcomes. What produces social phenomena are underlying structures and causes which are 
irreducible to the conceptions that social agents might have of them (Dean, Joseph, Roberts 
and Wight 2006: 8-9). This is quite distinct from a positivist approach which reduces the world 
to our empirical observation of supposedly predictable events. Yet the ¶SUREOHP of GLIIHUHQFH· 
presented in this special issue assumes the positivist understanding of science in making its 
case for rejecting the idea that difference is empirically discoverable, identifiable and thus ¶RXW 
WKHUH· In response to the contributors, I would ask whether there must surely be some element 
of difference that is ¶RXW WKHUH· and identifiable for this whole discussion to be meaningful in 
the first place? It might be correct to suggest that the three strands of peacebuilding 
understand difference in an essentialist way as an attribute of different people while ignoring 
that difference presupposes relations of power. However, are these relations of power not ¶RXW 
WKHUH· and in some way identifiable? If not, how can have a meaningful discussion about them? 
Even if we follow current trends and say that our job is not to analyse but to let these relations 
¶VSHDN to XV· this is still an ¶REMHFW oriented RQWRORJ\· The issue is not to abandon either the 
ontological claim of a reality ¶RXW WKHUH· or the epistemological aim of meaningful identification, 
but to ask what sort of reality (difference) is ¶RXW WKHUH· and what are the problems and 
limitations in our understanding of this reality (difference)? Contra positivism, the social world 
is indeed relational in the sense that it is made up of social relations rather than ¶WKLQJV· 
However, this is different from the relational views presented here which tend to focus on 
relations between people (anthropological fieldwork), elements of discourse (poststructuralism 
/ postmarxism) or between ideas and world views (phenomenology). 
 
There are two problematic responses to this challenge present in this volume that I think realist 
work on power and social structure can help clarify. One is to argue for the importance of 
power relations in the vaguest poststructuralist sense of power being everywhere. The other is 
to reduce power to relations between people, or to take an intersubjective view of these 
relations that reduce them to world views. This is the result of the philosophical assumptions 
behind the largely poststructuralist or phenomenological arguments that inform the 
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contributions to this Special Issue. 
 
The first problem is one of vagueness. By following poststructuralism, the danger is that power 
becomes the primary social relation that explains all others. But if power is everywhere, and 
behind everything, we lose sight of anything outside of the play of power. This does not really 
help in the identification of the dynamics behind power. Considering anything outside of 
power relations themselves is said to be essentialist - discussion of things like capitalism or 
colonialism will themselves be considered a return to essentialism. 
 
The other issue with relationality as articulated in the special issue is the tendency to see social 
relations in terms of something between people. This is well illustrated in the references to 
0LQRZ·V work where she sees difference lying in the relations between people rather than within 
them (Minow 1990: 79). This is certainly preferable to the essentialist positions being critiqued 
where difference is located in some SHRSOH·V essential and discrete characteristics. But this is 
only one aspect of the picture since power and difference are also positional in the sense that 
peoSOH·V characters, dispositions, powers, capacities, understandings and so on derive from 
their social positioning, or their relation to social relations. This social positioning, as Bhaskar 
(1993: 160) argues, is more than just relations between people, but is ¶IRXU SODQDU· consisting 
of material transactions with nature, inter-intra subjective personal relations, the plane of social 
relations and the plane of the subjectivity of the agent. There are a multiplicity of potentially 
disjoint rhythmics conceived of as a tense socio-spatialising process where elements of each 
plane are subject to multiple and conflicting determinations. 
 
Jeffrey ,VDDF·V well known intervention on power also helps clarify the question of social 
positioning and context. It makes the argument that social power refers to the capacities to 
act possessed by agents. This is by virtue of their participation within enduring social relations 
which distribute the power to act in certain ways to different people. Hence it is these social 
relations rather than the behavior ² or interaction ² which they shape, which are the conditions 
of possibility for interaction (Isaac 1987: 22-23). 
 
In contrast, some of the contributors are keen to promote an overly-intersubjective view of 
social relations that downplays or ignores these other social aspects. Brigg, in particular, argues 
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for power being seen in relation to worldview that powerful actors promote and their 
particular conceptions of truth and reality (Brigg 2008: 11). World views are said to be what 
constitute difference because these promote notions of normal and deviant.   
 
This view, while undeniable, is also only partial because it neglects other areas identified in the 
four planar model. Power here is rooted in the relation between subjects and their worldview, 
rather than being rooted in their four planar social situation. In particular, there is a danger 
here of turning the question of power into an epistemological question, effectively turning the 
complexity of our social situation into the socially constructed understandings we have of it. 
While this goes some way in identifying the social production of difference, it does not tell us 
the whole story of its social-structural conditions of possibility. Instead these are turned into 
subjective, discursive or phenomenological concerns. The HGLWRUV· introduction makes the 
useful corrective that linking difference to worldviews transforms the issue from questions 
such as what difference is and where it resides to ones of how it is constructed. However, even 
to address the question of its construction requires a wider social ontology than the one 
provided by a focus on worldviews or the intersubjective dimension of the exercise of power. 
 
Recent approaches to relationality 
 
Much of the discussion of relationality in IR today is monopolized by postructuralist and 
now new materialist thinking with a few notable dissenting voices such as Behr (2018, this 
issue) who draws on older phenomenological traditions. Certainly, older, materialist or 
philosophically realist accounts of relationality are ignored. This section will therefore 
address some of the new developments in relationality by taking a more established, if 
currently less fashionable, point of view.  
 
Most of the relevant recent issues are expertly raised (although not always satisfactorily 
addressed) by the arguments of Morgan Brigg ² here, and in previous work. In this forum 
he tries to steer a middle ground by presenting a relational approach, but also criticizing 
some of the philosophy underlying recent versions of this. While the earlier approaches to 
difference in peacebuilding presented an identitarian logic that foregrounds fixed, coherent 
entities, the relational approach of recent years takes a non-essentialist approach that 
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conceptualizes difference as contestable, fluid and ephemeral. Brigg (2018, this issue) rightly 
highlights some concerns with these approaches. 
 
While ignoring the large body of relational work present in Marxism, dialectical thinking, 
¶(DVWHUQ· philosophy, philosophical realism, existentialism and phenomenology, recent 
International Relations has followed the trend of portraying the dominant system of thought 
as a form of Newtonian physics based on ¶WKLQJV· and discrete entities rather than processes 
and relations. The new trend ² which can certainly be found in the recent interest in such 
things as resilience ² is to argue for complexity, emergence, non-linearity, multiple states, 
adaptive systems and so on. As Brigg says, these new arguments seek to render everything a 
little more unstable than previously thought, a little more uncertain and unpredictable, with 
outcomes that are more contingent and accidental.  
 
Brigg (2018, this issue) agrees with de-essentialising approaches insofar as they see differences 
as fluid, contested and contestable. But he also sees that anti-essentialist arguments tend to 
embrace a flat ontology which is so pluralistic that difference can lose its meaningful purchase 
p.6 of online version. As he says, the consequence of this is to undermine ¶the grounds upon 
which people may claim difference and resist dominance, including the framing and control 
of their lives· p.6 of online version. This is absolutely correct and is a criticism that postcolonial 
theorists often raise against new materialists and others who suggest, following Latour (2005: 
16), that we render social relations as ontologically flat. Nevertheless, Brigg remains committed 
to an interactional ontology which in my view makes it difficult to see where dominance or 
hierarchy comes from. He writes that this approach challenges us to stop thinking over and 
above the world (another example of setting up ¶PRGHUQLVW· science) and to place knowing the 
world inside the world of interaction, making knowledge dependent upon SHRSOH·V ways of 
being p.10 of online version.  
 
Epistemologically this runs the danger of what Bhaskar calls the epistemic fallacy, reducing 
the way that the world is, to the knowledge we have of it (Bhaskar 1989). In this sense, despite 
its concerns, it stands alongside other ¶LQVLGHU· approaches including constructivism, 
phenomenology and recent practice theory. It still relates difference to interaction itself rather 
than what might provide the conditions of possibility for this interaction to take place and 
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what might thus be responsible for the unequal positions that the actors occupy. How else 
might we address why hierarchies exist and are evident in this interaction? Interaction and 
performance sustains them, but what produces them in the first place? 
 
In his earlier work, Brigg sees difference in terms of systems of signification which again 
raises the ontological question of why signification occurs in the way it does, with unequal 
positions of power? He draws on /DFODX·V work on the ¶HPSW\ VLJQLILHU· to demonstrate the 
incompleteness of representation and difference. The empty signifier refers to the ¶structural 
impossibility in signification· (Brigg and Muller 2009: 406), yet this impossibility remains ¶an 
integral part of a system of VLJQLILFDWLRQ· (Brigg and Muller 2009: 405). It is something that is 
real yet unable to be represented. The emphasis, therefore, falls upon the impossibility of 
representation. This should be embraced since, contrary to the earlier ¶HVVHQWLDOLVW· 
conceptions of peacebuilding, these are not problems to be solved, but real and positive 
impossibilities (Brigg and Muller 2009: 408). Accepting this helps us to better respect cultural 
difference. However, embracing /DFODX·V approach also involves clear attempts to avoid the 
idea that social relations and hierarchies might somehow preexist the process of articulation. 
Let us be clear what this position entails. As Laclau says, ¶In my perspective, there is no 
beyond the play of differences, no ground which would a priori privilege some elements of 
the whole over the others. Whatever centrality an element acquires, it has to be explained by 
the play of differences as such· (Laclau 2002: 69). The criticisms Brigg raises in his 
contribution to this special issue and in particular, his warning not to embrace pluralism to 
the point where difference can lose its meaningful purchase, should therefore be applied 
more widely to Laclau and others who deny that anything meaningful exists outside the play 
of difference and moment of articulation.  
 
In a different approach, Hirblinger and Landau (2018, this issue) wish to stress the fluid, multi-
layered and context-dependent nature of ethnic identity through a turn to recent IR practice 
theory. They argue that ethnicity is more a political category than a scientific one and that it 
can be known through its tangible effects. To this end, they draw on Adler and 3RXOLRW·V 
understanding of practices as socially meaningful action which acts out background knowledge 
and discourse and forms the ¶G\QDPLF material and ideational processes that enable structures 
to be stable or to evolve, and agents to reproduce or to transform VWUXFWXUHV· (Adler and 
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Pouliot 2011, 4). The problem with this argument is that Adler and Pouliot invoke the notion 
of social structures but never spell out what this means (see Joseph and Kurki 2017). The 
terminology here is close to critical realism, but it is clear, looking at the rest of their arguments 
that it is on the notion of practice that most of the explanatory power falls. By contrast, a 
critical realist notion of ¶SRVLWLRQHG SUDFWLFHV· that locates the day to day actions of people 
within the context of deeper social structures that these practices reproduce and occasionally 
transform ² for example how work practices reproduce deeper capitalist social relations or 
how development practices reproduce deep inequalities in the international system ² offers 
more promise of capturing the notion of hierarchical relations and inequalities of power.  
 
 
Performativity and practice 
 
An important part of the ¶SUDFWLFH WXUQ· is a new emphasis on performativity. As noted in the 
introduction, this position emphasizes how actors perform their identities through various 
discourses and practices. It avoids ¶HVVHQWLDOLVP· by suggesting that subjects come into being 
through (self) enactment. This is good insofar as it rejects the idea of actors having some 
essential identity but it also has the effect of wiping out such notions as history, modernity, 
traditions, as well as science, thus reducing or limiting our ability to discuss the importance of 
social relations. Instead, everything is the product of discourses and practices. There is nothing 
meaningful outside of these. We are back to the problems which are evident in /DFODX·V 
philosophy. 
 
There are important arguments in this special issue which usefully engage with performativity 
approaches, but which would benefit from setting this in the context of a deeper social 
ontology in order to avoid the pitfalls of radical relationalism. Róisín 5HDG·V article in this issue 
(2018) highlights the struggle faced by female aid workers to perform ¶DXWKHQWLFLW\· in the field 
of humanitarian intervention. Difference operates through juxtaposition of roles ² the roles 
of the women are contrasted with the men around them and in particular, in relation to the 
more experienced, more ¶UHDO· aid workers. Noticeable again is the critique of objectivity 
present in 5HDG·V argument about the practices of intervention where the accounts of the 
participants are not seen as ¶REMHFWLYH WUXWK· but examples of ¶IOHVK ZLWQHVVLQJ·  
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María Martín de Almagro (2018, this issue) develops the concept of ¶hybrid FOXEV· to emphasise 
the non-essential character of difference. This draws on performativity to show how actors 
can belong to different clubs and perform in a certain way while not being essentially attached 
to them. As she says: 
 
I propose the concept of the ´ K\EULG FOXEµ as a cluster of local and international actors 
that join forces to develop a series of peacebuilding and development initiatives. The 
club can be considered as a diagnostic site for studying complex processes of 
differentiation and identification in post-conflict settings. First, I argue that hybrid 
clubs constitute spaces where difference is crafted and performed through the sharing 
of knowledge and practices with and only with the members of the club. P.2 of version 
sent 
 
This is an important argument that could be taken in a number of directions, much like 
Hirblinger and /DQGDX·V discussion of how difference is ¶VFDOHG· However, it is a performative 
account rather than a structural one ² difference is made through the complex performances 
of individual and collective bodies. A relational account, rather than being based on the four 
interactions discussed earlier, is taken to mean a focus on the ¶dynamic and ever-changing 
relationship amongst agents« [who] acquire meaning through and are constituted by their 
transactions, connections and relations with other actors·. P.3 of version sent 
 
The editors rightly argue that drawing attention to the performativity of difference also means 
examining how differences are situated in particular social and historical contexts. This means 
that difference cannot be understood simply by looking at performance alone, as if identity is 
produced only at the moment of interaction between people. If Hirblinger and Landau are 
correct, then the ¶VFDOLQJ· of difference implies that people belong to a variety of different 
groups at different levels with, as Martín de Almagro suggests, actors being ¶ORFDO· in some 
situations, and ¶international· in others. This is also a part of the process of claiming legitimacy 
at that particular scale, while power operates to deny this, or to exercise strategic selectivity 
over agents and their strategies. If peacebuilding strategies operate to select particular types of 
identity and difference, then the realist implications of this need to be developed. The situation 
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is not simply the product of interaction, but is already ¶RXW WKHUH· (in the sense of %RXUGLHX·V 
realist notion of field) if differences depend on time and context. Indeed, the choice might be 
between the flat ontology offered by Latour and many of the current trends in IR, and that 
offered by Bourdieu and his more realist interpreters who suggest that habitus cannot be 
determined solely in relation to other groups and their worldviews and that the field is indeed 
¶RXW WKHUH· 
 
Latour believes that we need a flat ontology in order to render the social world more clearly 
visible (2005: 16). We should talk only of those things and processes that we observe in social 
interactions, avoiding talk of underlying structures. The latter would require us to engage in 
abstract explanations that impose themselves on what we are trying to observe (Latour 200, 
2010). He believes that such approaches end up reproducing dominant relations of power 
because they appeal to some higher authority and some of these sentiments are evident in this 
special issue. By contrast, my argument would be that by refusing to put experience and 
difference in this wider context we fail to fully understand the practices we are trying to 
describe. As Bhaskar argues, this is an ontological question where 
 
By secreting an ontology based on the category of experience, the domains of reality 
(the domains of the real, the actual, and the empirical) are collapsed into one. This 
prevents the crucial question of the conditions under which experience is, in fact, 
significant in science from being posed (Bhaskar 1989, 15). 
 
Thus to talk of the experience or performance of difference in peacebuilding still requires 
us to talk of underlying social structures that, in a sense, make experience and 
performance possible as well as imposing constraints upon it. Despite recent practice 
theory claiming Bourdieu as an influence, he himself is clear that to account for practices 
and performances, we need to relate these to the ¶REMHFWLYH structure defining the social 
conditions for the production of the KDELWXV· (1977: 78). Colin :LJKW·V realist reading of 
Bourdieu suggests that habitus can be understood through the notion of positioned practices 
as a mediating link between agents and the socio-cultural world that they share (Wight 2006, 
49). This is inspired by Bhaskar·s argument that we need to understand the ¶point of contact· 
between human agency and social structures by examining a mediating system of positions ² 
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places, functions, rules, tasks, duties, etc., and practices, activities etc., which are engaged in 
by virtue of agents· occupancy of social positions. Crucially, this position-practice system is 
to be understood relationally (Bhaskar 1989, 40²41). I thus offer this understanding of 
relationality in contrast with that outlined in the Special Issue. 
 
As Milja Kurki and I have argued elsewhere (Joseph and Kurki 2018) , some notion of 
structure is necessary in order to make sense of some of Bourdieu·s key notions such as 
misrecognition, habitual reproduction and the largely unconscious nature of habitus. Social 
practices and performances act as the means of mediation between structures and agents and 
it is through the routines and everyday practices (highlighted in this special issue) that 
objective social structures are reproduced. Bourdieu sees these activities of the habitus as 
largely unconscious, unreflective or at least based on limited understanding of the wider 
context. Indeed, %RXUGLHX·V key notion of misrecognition depends upon this understanding 
of structure, agency and practice whereby practical taxonomies are understood as ¶a 
transformed, misrecognizable form of the real divisions of the social order« [that] 
contribute to the reproduction of that order by producing objectively orchestrated practices 
(Bourdieu 1977, 163). This makes the realist point that such practices produce 
misrecognition of a real situation. By rendering the world as ontologically flat and eschewing 
discussion of anything other than practices, it is Latour and those who follow his example 
who, in fact, contribute to the reproduction of existing social orders by refusing to examine 





Firstly, the strengths of the contributions present in this special issue were outlined. In 
particular, they identify and seek to rectify the errors of previous approaches to peacebuilding 
where difference is either discarded, identified as a problem to be overcome, or stigmatized as 
a reality at odds with our normal frames of reference. The arguments present in this special 
issue problematize, deconstruct and interrogate the ways that difference comes into being in 
order to provide a better understanding of the peacebuilding process. In doing so, I believe 
the contributions collected here offer important insights. 
 13 
 
However, I also argue that there are some limitations to such approaches due to their distance 
from realism, their skepticism about objectivity, their critique of knowledge claims and, in 
particular, the absence of a strong notion of social structure. In my view, this limits some of 
the important insights contained here. These are not problems specific to this volume, but are 
characteristic more generally of the current ¶SUDFWLFH WXUQ· and arguments for 
poststructuralism, new materialism and current arguments for non-essentialist relationality. 
 
With the practice turn as well as other recent developments, the focus falls upon that which is 
observable, the everyday, the common place, the ¶RQWLF· what goes on at the surface level 
(Kustermans 2016, 191). The effect of this, I have argued, is the neglect of the structural. The 
significance of this, I suggest, is that we are then denied the opportunity to adequately explain 
the context within which difference occurs, the hierarchies that underpin difference and the 
means for enacting the sort of social change that might overcome some of the more 
problematic elements of difference. 
 
In its place, I suggested that rather than trying to avoid the structure²agency relationship, we 
should adopt an approach to practices and difference that seeks to ¶SRVLWLRQ· practices 
(Bhaskar 1993) in their appropriate context, recognizing not only intersubjective relations, 
but the inter-intra, material and social character of these relations. These exist in a complex 
multiplicity of tense socio-spatialising processes. Yet, despite this complexity, analytical 
attention can be paid to the capacities possessed by agents by virtue of the positions they 
occupy, their capacities to act and their relation to enduring social structures that enable and 
constrain (Isaac 1987). 
 
In short, a relational approach to difference is more important than ever, but not without an 
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